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Arbitration Awards in an Environment of Compulsory
Unionization: Is the High Degree of Deference
Warranted?
I. INTRODUCTION
Advocates of compulsory unionization have long maintained that
conditioning continued employment upon union membership is not
discriminatory so long as anyone may join the union; a closed shop is
justified so long as there is an open union.1 The idea, stripped down
to its essentials, is that unions must play fair; whatever obligation
there is at the outset for unions to practice non-discriminatory
admission practices,2 that obligation grows when unions hold the
keys to the workshop.3
Since unions often hold the keys to the courtroom as well,4 they
must play fairly when pressing employee grievances. For example, it
is well-settled that a union that fails to press black union members’
allegations of discrimination runs afoul of both Title VII and §
1981;5 once the union is exclusively entrusted with filing claims for
its members, it must exercise that power fairly.6 Under compulsory

1. E.g., FRANK T. STOCKTON, THE CLOSED SHOP IN AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS 176
(1911); see also JOHN MITCHELL, ORGANIZED LABOR: ITS PROBLEMS, PURPOSES, AND
IDEALS AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN WAGE EARNERS 283 (1903).
2. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (2006).
3. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 283.
4. Often, but not always, whether and in what circumstances an employee may still file
a claim with the EEOC after already having arbitrated a claim of discrimination is a wellresearched topic beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). It is sufficient to note here that in certain circumstances, an
employee’s claim is barred by res judicata because of the union’s previous litigation or
arbitration of that claim. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23
(1991); cf. Jacobs v. CBS Broad., Inc., 291 F.3d 1173, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2002) (refusing to
give res judicata effect to a union decision because of the union’s lack of procedural formalities,
but reaffirming that union arbitration decisions, properly conducted, do merit res judicata
effect from the judiciary).
5. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987). While the holding in
Goodman has been superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a), and Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons
Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371, 383–84 (2004), the factual circumstances of Goodman continue to
show that a union’s interests may diverge from an individual worker’s interests.
6. Goodman, 482 U.S. at 669.
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unionism, however, the union holds the courthouse keys for both
the willingly and unwillingly unionized.7
The judiciary, while occasionally distinguishing between the
levels of deference given to union-controlled and individualcontrolled grievance procedures,8 has never used similar rationale to
distinguish between the subsets of union-controlled grievance
procedures—namely, closed9 and open shops.
The distinction drawn in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.10
between individual- and union-entered arbitration agreements
provides a workable rationale that could be extended to warrant
different treatment of closed- and open-shop arbitration awards. A
union’s previous arbitration of an employee’s racial discrimination
claim did not stop the employee from subsequently litigating on his
own behalf, because, inter alia, “[i]n arbitration, as in the collectivebargaining process, the interests of the individual employee may be
subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the
bargaining unit,” and “harmony of interest between the union and
the individual employee cannot always be presumed, especially where
a claim of racial discrimination is made.”11 The same rationale should
be applied in the context of arbitration awards—in particular, that in
at least some cases of individual arbitration awards agreed upon
through unionized arbitration, “the interests of the individual
employee may be subordinated to the collective interests of all
employees in the bargaining unit,” and, further, that “harmony of
interest between the union and the individual employee cannot
always be presumed.”12
Thus, because of the increased likelihood of divergent interests
between the individual worker and the union in a closed-shop

7. For a review of the statutory law governing closed shops, see infra Part III.A.
8. “Occasionally,” because the enforcement of arbitration agreements has
contemplated whether the individual or the union entered into the agreement, but the
enforcement of arbitration awards has not. See infra Part II.
9. This Comment uses the expression “closed shop” interchangeably with “compulsory
unionism.” For a discussion of whether “closed shop” is a misnomer, see infra Part III.A.
10. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The Gardner-Denver holding has been narrowed significantly
by subsequent decisions and may even “be a strong candidate for overruling” if it is inseparable
from its broader interpretation. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 n.8
(2009). Here, Gardner-Denver’s significance derives more from its position as the historical
high watermark of distrust in arbitration than from its (limited) continued vitality.
11. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19.
12. Id.
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setting, arbitration awards rendered in a closed shop ought to be
viewed with a higher level of scrutiny than they currently receive.13
Specifically, courts ought to view closed-shop labor arbitration
awards with a “manifest disregard of the law” standard of review that
involves actually verifying that an arbitrator has correctly applied the
law.
In making that argument, this Comment traces the evolutionary
split in case law governing union-based arbitration agreements and
union-based arbitration awards. Under current law, a union may
only agree to mandatory arbitration on behalf of its members when
the waiver of the right to litigate in the collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) is clear and unmistakable. In notable contrast,
once a labor arbitrator has rendered an award, a judge views the
completed award with substantial deference that involves an extreme
unwillingness to overturn labor arbitrators’ decisions. By claiming
that closed-shop labor arbitration decisions ought to be viewed
under a strict “manifest disregard of the law” standard of review, this
Comment argues that at least a subset of arbitration decisions should
follow the path of arbitration agreements.14
Part II of this Comment explores the divergence between the
judiciary’s unwillingness to enforce labor arbitration agreements and
its willingness to enforce completed labor arbitration awards. Part III
explains how compulsory unionization vitiates the reasons for
awarding labor arbitration awards a high degree of deference. Part
IV gives a modest suggestion for a standard of review of arbitration
awards that would be more appropriate in the context of compulsory
unionization. Part V concludes by noting that using a strict level of
scrutiny to review such arbitration awards is, ironically, a faithful
extension of the Supreme Court’s initial reasoning that gave
substantial deference to labor arbitration awards.

13. But this Comment does not argue that arbitration decisions made in an open shop
should necessarily receive the same amount of scrutiny they currently receive. This Comment
focuses on closed shops because they are more demonstrably illustrative of the possibility of a
divergence of interests between individual worker and union, but such a divergence may also
be found in an open shop with further research. Therefore, this Comment’s thesis could be
restated: closed-shop arbitration awards merit a higher degree of scrutiny than they currently
receive, and perhaps open-shop arbitration awards do as well. I disclaim any intention of
showing that there is a bright line between closed and open shops that merits higher scrutiny
for the former and the status quo for the latter.
14. Part II.A, infra, shows that judicial review of arbitration agreements is more
protective of the unionized worker than the non-unionized worker.
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II. DIVERGENT TRENDS IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS AND ARBITRATION AWARDS
That the judiciary has come to treat arbitration awards and
arbitration agreements differently is important not only as a basic
contextual background, but also to show that at least a subset of
arbitration awards—those rendered within a closed shop—should
follow the pattern of arbitration agreements.
As a preliminary introduction to a discussion of specific cases, it
will help to clarify the distinction between the enforcement of an
arbitration award and the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate
in the first place. For purposes of this Comment, a court enforces an
arbitration award15 when, after the parties have gone through the
entire arbitration process, the court refuses to alter the decision made
by the arbitrator. In contrast, a court enforces an arbitration
agreement when, before the parties ever go to arbitration, one of the
parties claims that it should not have to arbitrate its claim at all, and
the court compels that party to submit to arbitration. Although this
Comment ultimately speaks to the level of scrutiny with which courts
ought to view awards, the history of enforcing agreements is relevant:
this Part describes how some factors that have classically applied to
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement would logically apply
to the enforcement of an arbitration award.
A. The Development of the “Clear and Unmistakable Waiver of
Rights” Standard for Arbitration Agreements
With the above distinction in mind, the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the enforceability of arbitration agreements
demonstrates an evolving tension between the “longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements”16 and federal pro-arbitration
laws—namely, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)17 and the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA).18 The FAA makes most19

15. “Award” in this Comment, for purposes of simplicity, encompasses any arbitral
decision, whether representing monetary damages or injunctive relief.
16. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
17. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2006).
19. This Comment does not reach the FAA’s statutory construction debate, exemplified
by the majority and dissent in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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arbitration agreements enforceable,20 but generally does not apply to
organized labor,21 while the LMRA does. The culmination of the
following history of enforcing arbitration agreements is a two-tiered
system of treatment: a CBA must contain a clear and unmistakable
waiver of the right to litigate a claim in order for the arbitration
agreement to be enforceable; for non-union workers, there is no
such requirement.
1. Hostility gives way to pro-arbitration laws
Predating American independence, English courts regarded
arbitration agreements as an automatically suspect encroachment
into their domain.22 American courts were still demonstrating a
reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements when Congress, in

20. See Sandra F. Gavin, Unconscionability Found: A Look at Pre-Dispute Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements 10 Years after Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 54 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 249, 250–56 (2006).
21. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Eighty-Fourth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting Scholar
Lecture: The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233, 253 (2008).
Courts have not applied the FAA to labor arbitration because of the Act’s exclusion of
“contracts of employment” in § 1. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees of Am. v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310, 313 (3d Cir. 1951);
Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1067–68 (4th Cir.
1993). However, the Supreme Court, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, has held that the
“contracts of employment” exclusion applies “only [to] contracts of employment of
transportation workers.” 532 U.S. at 119. The extent of the FAA’s input in organized labor
arbitration (for unions not dealing in the actual transportation of goods) is therefore an open
question. Still, labor arbitration is most squarely governed by § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C.S.
§ 185. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 449–52 (1957);
Carbonneau, supra, at 253.
In any case, it is clear that cases decided under the FAA have influenced later cases
decided under the LMRA, and vice versa. Compare John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543, 544 (1964) (resolving a claim brought under the LMRA), with Necchi S.P.A. v.
Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp., 348 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1965) (referencing John
Wiley & Sons as a source of arbitration-agreement enforcement policy to resolve a claim
brought under the FAA). See also Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1127
(3d Cir. 1969) (making a decision under the LMRA while explicitly analogizing to the FAA).
Since demarcating the boundary between the LMRA and FAA is beyond the scope of this
Comment, it will be sufficient to note that both statutes have influenced the enforceability of
arbitration agreements and awards. Beyond that, the question of the exact boundary line
between the two acts will have to remain unresolved and in a footnote, as in Wright v.
Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78 n.1 (1998).
22. See Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746); see also Tobey v. County of
Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320 (C.C. Mass. 1845) (reviewing English cases refusing to enforce
arbitration agreements).
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response to a lobby of business and industry leaders,23 passed the
United States Arbitration Act in 1925.24 In the pre-Erie
jurisprudence of that time, the original goal of the FAA was to
provide federal courts sitting in a diversity action with some basis for
not overruling state laws that were already in place to enforce
arbitration agreements.25 Although the Supreme Court’s decision in
Erie would ostensibly have eliminated the need for the FAA, the Act
took on a life and reason of its own: in 1947 the FAA was readopted as positive law,26 and became “no longer a mere gap-filler,
but . . . the repository of a nascent federal policy.”27
In the same year that the FAA was re-adopted, Congress passed
the LMRA in response to President Truman’s request for
“legislation . . . to provide adequate means for settling industrial
disputes and avoiding industrial strife . . . in important, nationwide
industries.”28 Also known as the Taft-Hartley Act,29 the LMRA was
actually a group of amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act.30 Along with specific measures to limit the power of unions to

23. Carbonneau, supra note 21, at 245.
24. The United States Arbitration Act lost its naming section in 1947 and subsequently
became known as the Federal Arbitration Act. Wesley A. Sturges & Irving Olds Murphy, Some
Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 580, 580 n.1 (1952); Gavin, supra note 20, at 252.
25. Carbonneau, supra note 21, at 245–46. For a different view, see Michael H. LeRoy
& Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final and Binding Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale
Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 167, 175 (2008) (“Congress was determined to make
arbitration agreements enforceable everywhere but realized that federal jurisdiction was quite
limited in the 1920s.”).
26. Sturges & Murphy, supra note 24, at 580 n.1; Note, Enforceability Under the
United States Arbitration Act: Collective Bargaining Agreements and Contracts Not “Involving
Commerce,” 63 YALE L.J. 729, 729 n.1 (1954).
27. Carbonneau, supra note 21, at 249.
28. Steven E. Abraham, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Balance of Power in
Industrial Relations, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 341, 348 (1996) (citing FRED A. HARTLEY, OUR NEW
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY: THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT AND THE NEXT STEPS 74–75 (1948)).
President Truman eventually vetoed the bill, and the Taft-Hartley Act was passed over his veto.
Id. at 350–51.
29. Id. at 343 n.8.
30. Deborah A. Ballam, The Law as a Constitutive Force for Change, Part II: The Impact
of the National Labor Relations Act on the U.S. Labor Movement, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 452
(1995).
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disrupt industry,31 the LMRA seeks “to provide additional facilities
for the mediation of labor disputes affecting commerce.”32
2. Deference in practice: The Steelworkers Trilogy
In 1960, the Supreme Court decided the Steelworkers Trilogy.
The Steelworkers Trilogy is significant to this discussion because
arbitration agreements in a CBA (such as that negotiated between
the United Steelworkers Union and its employers) won enforcement
from the Supreme Court much earlier than those in individual
contract disputes.33 Specifically, United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.34 (Steelworkers I) began to reverse
the general lack of deference given to arbitration agreements.35
In that case, workers of a steel production company alleged that
the company had laid employees off for lack of work, and then
contracted with independent contractors, some of whom were the
laid-off workers, at a lower wage to do the same work.36 The
arbitration agreement stated that if there was any question about the
scope of the employment contract, the matter was to be resolved by
arbitration.37 The Supreme Court found that management’s decision
to dismiss employees and then contract with private workers was
within the purview of the arbitration agreement and, therefore,
precluded litigation in court.38
That same year, the Court continued the trend in United
Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co.39
31. For a discussion of these, see generally Steven E. Abraham, How the Taft-Hartley
Act Hindered Unions, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1994).
32. Pub. L. No. 80-101 (1947). The original full title of the public law constituting the
LMRA was “AN ACT To amend the National Labor Relations Act, to provide additional
facilities for the mediation of labor disputes affecting commerce, to equalize legal
responsibilities of labor organizations and employers, and for other purposes.” Id.
33. See infra Part II.B–C.
34. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (Steelworkers I),
363 U.S. 574 (1960).
35. Michael P. Wolf, Give ‘Em Their Day in Court: The Argument Against Collective
Agreements Mandating Arbitration to Resolve Employee Statutory Claims, 56 J. MO. B. 263,
264 (2000).
36. Steelworkers I, 363 U.S. at 576.
37. Id. at 575–76.
38. Id. at 583–85.
39. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co. (Steelworkers II), 363 U.S. 564
(1960).
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(Steelworkers II), by ruling that “courts cannot review the merits of
an arbitration award under the guise of examining arbitrability.”40 In
that case, United Steelworkers sought to compel arbitration of a
wage dispute that the employer had refused to submit to arbitration
and which the appellate court termed “frivolous” and “patently
baseless.”41 The Supreme Court found that it was not the province
of the courts to pass on the merits of something specifically
delegated to an arbitral board.42 In other words, since the matter of
whether or not there was any merit to wage disputes was supposed
to be arbitrated in the first place, the courts could not refuse to
compel arbitration, even though the lower courts had determined
that the claims were frivolous.43
3. The judiciary formally recognizes tension between union and worker
Despite the trends to recognize and enforce arbitration
agreements, the Court expressed apprehension that such agreements
could compromise individual interests. In Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co.,44 the Supreme Court addressed the topic of unionversus-non-union enforcement of arbitration agreements in a
footnote with broad implications.45 There, the Court
voiced concern about “the union’s exclusive control over the
manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented”
as well as concern that “[i]n arbitration, as in the collectivebargaining process, the interests of the individual employee may be
subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the

40. Elizabeth A. Roma, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses In Employment
Contracts and the Need for Meaningful Judicial Review (hereinafter Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses), 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 519, 536 n.124 (2004); see Steelworkers II,
363 U.S. at 568 (“Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract
interpretation for the arbitrator.”).
41. Steelworkers II, 363 U.S. at 568.
42. Id. at 569.
43. Id.
44. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme Court
declined to enforce a labor arbitration agreement as the sole means for redressing a statutory
dispute under a CBA. The worker complained that he had been terminated because of racial
discrimination. The Court held, simply, “that there can be no prospective waiver of an
employee’s rights under Title VII.” Id. at 51. Elaborating, the Court stated that some
statutory rights may be waivable, but only those rights related to a “collective activity” or a
“majoritarian process[],” such as the right to strike. Id.
45. Id. at 58 n.19.
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bargaining unit.”46

Gardner-Denver decided that an individual was not barred from
litigating a discrimination claim in his own right even after his union
arbitrated the claim.47
Seventeen years later, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.48
reevaluated the anti-arbitration reasoning that emerged from
Gardner-Denver. The Gilmer Court held that a non-union worker’s
statutory claim could be subjected, exclusively, to a mandatory
arbitration agreement.49 Thus the Supreme Court distinguished the
analysis used in Gardner-Denver which was that arbitration
agreements stemming from statutory claims of non-collective rights
are unenforceable.50 Regardless of how genuine the distinctions51
between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer are, Gilmer is emblematic of a
newly adopted pro-arbitration policy by the Supreme Court.52

46. Carol Van Sambeek, The Four Corners Approach to Judging the Enforceability of
Arbitration Agreements, Which Waive Statutory Rights to Litigate Employment Discrimination
Claims, 5 APPALACHIAN J.L. 247, 253–54 (2006) (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58
n.19).
47. 415 U.S. at 59–60.
48. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
49. Id. at 23.
50. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51.
51. The Gilmer Court distinguished Gardner-Denver on three grounds. First, the issue
in Gardner-Denver was whether resolution of a contractual claim in an arbitral forum
precluded subsequent resolution of that claim in a judicial forum. Although the GardnerDenver Court had ruled that arbitration of a contractual claim did not eliminate one’s right to
a day in court for a statutory claim, the situation in Gilmer involved an employee who had
specifically agreed to arbitrate his statutory claims. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. Second, GardnerDenver was decided “in the context of a collective bargaining agreement . . . . An important
concern therefore was the tension between collective representation and individual statutory
rights, a concern not applicable to the present case.” Id. Third, Gardner-Denver was not
decided under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id.
52. See, e.g., Carbonneau, supra note 21, at 234 (“The landmark cases in labor and
employment arbitration—Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (the ‘old time religion’) and
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (the ‘new age’ thinking)—attest to the enormous
distance that separates past and present concepts of legal due process and fundamental
rights.”); Gavin, supra note 20, at 255 (“The 1991 landmark decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. illustrates just how far the Court had come since its refusal to
apply the FAA to contracts involving the Securities Act in Wilko.” (footnote omitted));
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, supra note 40, at 525 (“[T]he [Gilmer] Court’s attitude
towards arbitration was distinctively different [from the attitude of the Gardner-Denver Court]
. . . .”).
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In the 1998 case of Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,53
the Supreme Court tried to reconcile the discordance between
Gardner-Denver and Gilmer. The union employee had brought a
statutory lawsuit against his employer for violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, and the employer had argued that the litigation
was precluded by the arbitration agreement included in the union’s
CBA.54 For union-based arbitration agreements, the Court
introduced a “clear and unmistakable waiver” test to determine if the
arbitration agreement precluded litigation of statutory claims,55 thus
placing primary importance on the construction of the actual labor
contract. Since the union’s CBA with the employer contained only a
generalized arbitration clause, the employee was entitled to litigate
his claim in court.56 The Court declined, however, to rule that a
statutory discrimination claim could never be relegated to
arbitration, expressly reserving that question for another day.57
The reason why the “clear and unmistakable waiver of rights”
test applied only to CBAs helped to reconcile Gardner-Denver with
Gilmer: although both cases involved an employee’s waiver of the
right to litigate statutory rights in an arbitration agreement,
Gardner-Denver involved a union’s waiver of statutory rights, while
Gilmer involved an individual’s waiver.58
We think the [clear and unmistakable waiver] standard [is]
applicable to a union-negotiated waiver of employees’ statutory
right to a judicial forum for claims of employment
discrimination. . . . [W]hether or not Gardner-Denver’s seemingly
absolute prohibition of union waiver of employees’ federal forum
rights survives Gilmer, Gardner-Denver at least stands for the
proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient
importance to be protected against less-than-explicit union waiver
in a CBA.59

Wright is significant to the topic of judicial review of arbitration
agreements (and arbitration awards) for two reasons. First, it

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

1020

Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 75–77 (1998).
Id. at 72–75.
Id. at 80.
See id. at 82.
Id. at 82 n.2.
Id. at 80.
Id.
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explicitly stated the key rationale for presuming arbitrability in labor
disputes: “arbitrators are in a better position than courts to interpret
the terms of a CBA.”60 Second and more importantly, the Wright
Court established a tiered standard for enforcing arbitration
agreements under a CBA versus an individual employment contract:
a waiver of the right to litigate a statutory claim in court must be
clear and unmistakable if it is within a CBA; this does not apply for
an individual waiver of statutory rights.61
Presumably, the non-represented employee is bound by the
terms of the arbitration agreement that he or she supposedly
negotiates, or at least assents to, and therefore that employee
should be aware of any waiver contained within that agreement.
However, because the union, not its represented employees,
negotiates a CBA, any waiver of statutory rights has to be clear so
that the employees will be aware of these terms when they vote on
the CBA.62

Furthermore, the union provides an additional “layer of
bureaucracy” that employees must overcome to assert their rights.63
The Wright Court emphasized that the waiver of statutory rights by
the union be “clear and unmistakable” so as to eliminate confusion
over the power of the union to arbitrate statutory claims in the place
of the workers.64
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett65 may have blunted GardnerDenver’s recognition that a union does not always represent an
employee’s best interests, but it left intact Wright’s distantly
correlative two-tiered approach to enforcing arbitration agreements.
At issue was whether a CBA that clearly and unmistakably called for
arbitration of an Age Discrimination and Employment Act
(“ADEA”) claim was enforceable.66 In answering in the affirmative
(and reversing the lower courts’ decisions), the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that discrimination claims may never be relegated to

60. Id. at 78. The Court referenced two cases to support this proposition: AT&T Tech.,
Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986), and Steelworkers I, 363 U.S. 574, 581–
82 (1960).
61. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80–81.
62. Van Sambeek, supra note 46, at 255.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
66. Id. at 1461.
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arbitration in a CBA.67 Inasmuch as the waiver of the right to litigate
in the CBA was clear and unmistakable68 (and the ADEA contained
no independent bar to arbitration), the respondents’ age
discrimination claims were properly subjected to arbitration.69
While 14 Penn Plaza answered the unresolved question from
Wright (statutory claims may indeed be subject to mandatory
arbitration in a CBA), it simultaneously retreated from GardnerDenver’s “broad dicta . . . highly critical of the use of arbitration for
the vindication of statutory antidiscrimination rights.”70 In particular,
the 14 Penn Plaza Court rejected three specific strands of antiarbitration dicta in Garden-Denver. First, “an agreement to submit
statutory discrimination claims to arbitration [is not] tantamount to
a waiver of those rights.”71 Second, it is a misconception that
arbitrators are unqualified to decide legal questions; rather it is
within the “arbitrator’s capacity to resolve complex questions of fact
and law.”72 Third, while it may be true, as Gardner-Denver suggests,
that “a union [in arbitration] may subordinate the interests of an
individual employee to the collective interests of all employees in the
bargaining unit,” that “judicial policy concern” is an insufficient
“source of authority” for limiting the application of an arbitration
agreement.73
Significantly, Wright’s two-tiered approach to enforcing
arbitration agreements (under a CBA, they must be clear and
unmistakable; not so for an individual employee) is only
strengthened by the 14 Penn Plaza holding.74 Thus, while Gardner-

67. Id. at 1464.
68. The 14 Penn Plaza respondents argued that the waiver was not, in fact, clear and
unmistakable, but the Court refused to consider this argument, since it had not been raised
below. Id. at 1473–74.
69. Id. at 1466.
70. Id. at 1469.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1471.
73. Id. at 1472.
74. In the following quotation, the first sentence, taken out of context, would seem to
belie this assertion, but the second sentence qualifies the first and sanctions Wright’s tiered
approach: “Nothing in the law suggests a distinction between the status of arbitration
agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed to by a union representative.
This Court has required only that an agreement to arbitrate statutory antidiscrimination claims
be ‘explicitly stated’ in the collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 1465 (quoting Wright v.
Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998)).
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Denver’s broad dicta make it “a strong candidate for overruling,”75
the emergent standard of review for arbitration agreements indirectly
contemplates the possibility of disunity between the union and
employee: the requirement that there be a “clear and unmistakable”
waiver of the right to litigate in a CBA assures that the individual
employee will be personally aware of the arbitration agreement when
she votes on the CBA, even though it is the union that negotiates
the CBA.76 Thus, by imposing additional requirements on arbitration
agreements contained within CBAs, the judiciary has made it harder
to have an enforceable arbitration agreement within a CBA than in
an individual worker’s contract.
B. The Development of the “Manifest Disregard of Law” Standard for
Arbitration Awards
1. Historically, arbitration awards receive general acceptance
While arbitration agreements have ultimately become enforceable
for unions only after proving a clear and unmistakable waiver of
rights, arbitration awards have historically enjoyed—and still
receive—a higher level of deference. English courts gave “full effect
to [arbitration] agreements . . . after they had ripened into
arbitrators’ awards.”77 American courts likewise seldom overturned
the completed award of an arbitrator.78 That the parties had
voluntarily79 submitted to the arbitration itself (rather than in the
context of a future, executory agreement) infused the arbitration
award with a contract-like character that won approval and
enforcement from both English and American courts.80 The FAA, in

75. Id. at 1469 n.8.
76. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
77. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 (2d Cir.
1942).
78. Gavin, supra note 20, at 251 n.15 (citing IAN R. MCNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
LAW: REFORMATION—NATIONALIZATION—INTERNALIZATION 20 (1992)).
79. “Voluntarily” because either party could revoke the executory arbitration agreement
at any time. Id. at 252.
80. One reason for the substantial deference given arbitration awards under the
common law of early American and English courts may have been the contract-like character of
the completed award. An 1845 Massachusetts court decision may reference contractual
principles when it delineates between “awards . . . fairly and lawfully made” and compulsion of
“a reluctant party to submit to [an arbitral] tribunal”:
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turn, though not drafted specifically to address the issue of judicial
review of arbitration awards,81 did outline four bases for overturning
a completed award: (1) “the award was procured by corruption [or]
fraud”; (2) the award evidences “partiality or corruption” of the
arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators are “guilty of misconduct” or
prejudicial behavior, such as “refusing to postpone [a] hearing” or
hear pertinent evidence; and (4) “the arbitrators [have] exceeded
their powers, or . . . imperfectly executed them.”82
2. “Manifest disregard of law” emerges as a check on arbitration
awards
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided Wilko v. Swan.83 Although
in dicta,84 the Wilko Court created the “manifest disregard of law”
standard: a court will not overturn an arbitration award unless the
arbitrator’s decision displays a “manifest disregard” of law.85 The
Courts of equity do not refuse to interfere to compel a party specifically to perform
an agreement to refer to arbitration, because they wish to discourage arbitrations, as
against public policy. On the contrary, they have and can have no just objection to
these domestic forums, and will enforce, and promptly interfere to enforce their
awards when fairly and lawfully made, without hesitation or question. But when
they are asked to proceed farther and to compel the parties to appoint arbitrators
whose award shall be final, they necessarily pause to consider, whether such tribunals
possess adequate means of giving redress, and whether they have a right to compel a
reluctant party to submit to such a tribunal, and to close against him the doors of
the common courts of justice, provided by the government to protect rights and to
redress wrongs.
. . . [I]f a submission has been made to arbitrators . . . with an express
stipulation, that the submission shall be irrevocable, it still is revocable and
countermandable, by either party, before the award is actually made, although not
afterwards.
Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320–21 (C.C. Mass. 1845).
81. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2008).
82. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1–4) (2008).
83. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The investor claimed that the company had
made false representations and thereby induced him to purchase stock on false pretenses. The
Court found that the arbitration agreement specifically violated the Securities Act of 1933,
which forbad mandatory arbitration in stock-purchase agreements, and therefore refused to
compel arbitration. Id. at 428–31, 434–38. Wilko was eventually overruled for reasons
unrelated to this Comment by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989).
84. Justice Jackson found the Court’s exposition of possible reasons to overturn an
arbitral award to be unnecessary to the decision; he therefore wrote a separate concurrence to
demonstrate his support for the limited holding that the Securities Act of 1933 precludes predispute arbitration agreements. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438–39 (Jackson, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 436–37.
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“manifest disregard of law” standard has become the touchstone for
judicial review of arbitral awards.86 Notably, section 10 of the FAA,
which lists the bases for vacating an arbitration award, mentions
nothing of “manifest disregard of law”—lower federal courts seeking
to implement this standard of review have shoe-horned it in with 9
U.S.C. § 10(a)(4): an arbitration award may be vacated if “the
arbitrators exceeded their powers.”87 Thus, although “manifest
disregard of law” was coined in a case that did not deal with
arbitration awards, it has become the shorthand for the FAA’s
undergirding principle of judicial review of arbitration awards.
3. Steelworkers III lays the foundation for giving CBA-based
arbitration awards extra deference
While Wilko produced an easily repeatable standard for judicial
review of arbitration awards, Steelworkers III88 set the stage for CBAbased arbitration awards to receive extra deference. In contrast to its
companion cases in the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Steelworkers III
decision enforced an arbitration award—not an agreement—that
had been overturned by a lower court.89 Four aspects of Steelworkers
III are noteworthy in this context—four markers why CBA-based
arbitration awards have received extra deference.
a. The premise of Steelworkers III: the bargained-for arbitration
award. In enforcing the arbitration award, the Supreme Court
explicitly stated a basic premise relating to CBA-based arbitration
awards: the arbitrator’s award was bargained for in the sense that it
represents what the parties (employer and union) get in exchange for

86. See, e.g., First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
87. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930,
933–34 (2d Cir. 1986). This case has been criticized insofar as it portrayed “manifest disregard
of the law” as an additional, judicially created ground for overturning an arbitration award.
AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Oxford Mgmt. Servs., 627 F. Supp. 2d 85, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
The criticism is well founded: in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the Supreme
Court ruled that the FAA’s stated grounds for vacating an arbitration award are exclusive. 128
S. Ct. 1396, 1402–03 (2008). Thus “manifest disregard of the law” is significant as a standard
of review only to the extent that it serves as a shorthand for the FAA’s stated grounds for
vacatur. Whether the Hall Street decision will produce a measurable change in judicial scrutiny
of arbitration awards remains to be seen.
88. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel and Car Corp. (Steelworkers III), 363
U.S. 593 (1960).
89. Id. at 595–96, 598–99.
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what they give under the collective bargaining agreement.90 “It is the
arbitrator’s construction which was bargained for; and so far as the
arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts
have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the
contract is different from his.”91
b. The rationale of Steelworkers III: pro-arbitration policy and
superior qualification. Next, the Supreme Court made explicit its
rationale for upholding the arbitration award: if courts interfered in
the arbitration award, then that would undermine the policy of
settling labor disputes by arbitration.92 Arbitrators, furthermore, are
qualified to resolve such disputes because of their specialized
knowledge in the industry.93
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration
award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor
disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had
the final say on the merits of the awards. . . . They sit to
settle disputes at the plant level—disputes that require for
their solution knowledge of the custom and practices of a
particular factory or of a particular industry as reflected in
particular agreements.94
c. The mixed authority of Steelworkers III: references to arbitration
agreements. Notably, the Court cites Steelworkers I, an arbitration
agreement-enforcement case, to explain its reasoning for enforcing
an arbitration award.95 Ostensibly, employment of specialized
knowledge to foster industrial stability favors upholding both
arbitration agreements and arbitration awards. “As we stated in
[Steelworkers I], . . . decided this day, the arbitrators under these
collective agreements are indispensable agencies in a continuous
collective bargaining process.”96 This is significant because it shows

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
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that, at least at one point in time, the Supreme Court employed the
same reasons to justify enforcing arbitration agreements as it did to
justify enforcing arbitration awards.
d. The timing of Steelworkers III: before the divergence of levels of
scrutiny for arbitration awards and arbitration agreements. The
Steelworkers Trilogy was decided fourteen years before the arbitration
agreement rationale and arbitration award rationale began to
diverge, when the Gardner-Denver Court observed in a footnote
that under a CBA, “the interests of the individual employee may be
subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the
bargaining unit.”97 It would be an additional twenty-four years
before the Gardner-Denver footnote ripened into a split approach to
arbitration agreement enforcement in Wright; namely, that in order
to enforce arbitration agreements under a CBA (but not for an
individual worker), there must be a “clear and unmistakable waiver”
of the right to litigate a statutory claim in court.98 The arbitration
award-enforcement cases since Steelworkers III (discussed
immediately below) show that no analogous judicial suspicion has
arisen with respect to arbitration awards given under a CBA. In fact,
they are subject to less judicial scrutiny.
4. The “manifest disregard of law” standard takes on a different
meaning for CBA-based arbitration awards
Nine years after Steelworkers III, the Third Circuit decided
Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher, and ruled that the
district court erred by overturning the ruling of an arbitrator
concerning the promotion of a union employee.99 Although the
Fletcher court claimed to recycle the “manifest disregard of the law”
standard from Wilko,100 the court found that the presence of a CBA
reduced the scrutiny that arbitration awards should be subject to:

97. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974).
98. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998).
99. Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1125, 1133 (3d Cir. 1969).
100. Id. at 1127–28 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953) (overruled on
other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989))).
Wilko was decided under the FAA, 346 U.S. at 436, while Fletcher was decided under the
LMRA, 405 F.2d at 1125 n.1. For a brief discussion of the overlap of rationale, see supra note
21.
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[P]erceiving that the Supreme Court’s announced standards
in reviewing commercial awards call for the exercise of
judicial restraint, we must conclude that such a philosophy of
restricted review compels even less judicial interference in
matters arising from labor arbitration. At the very least this
means that the interpretation of labor arbitrators must not be
disturbed so long as they are not in “manifest disregard” of
the law, and that “whether the arbitrators misconstrued a
contract” does not open the award to judicial review.101
Thus, the Fletcher court openly adopted a highly deferential
standard of review for arbitration awards made within a CBA.
Although not dealing specifically with judicial review of
arbitration awards in the CBA context, Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson
Navigation Co.102 further eroded the meaning of the “manifest
disregard of law” standard. In Sun Ship, the Third Circuit cited its
previous ruling in Fletcher103 for the proposition that a court may not
“consider whether the arbitrators committed an error of law.”104
Judicial review of arbitrators’ contractual interpretations was likewise
broadly proscribed.105 Since a Third Circuit judge may not consider
whether arbitrators have made errors of either law or contract
interpretation under the current terms of “manifest disregard of
law,” the juridical apple has fallen far from the initial tree. Ironically,
then, the “manifest disregard of law” standard has become
synonymous with a standard that nearly forecloses judicial review
entirely—a super-deference.
Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers, District 31106
represents a similar development in the Fourth Circuit in the CBA
context. The court reversed the decision of the District Court,
finding that the District Court had improperly undertaken to
interpret the language of a CBA and of legal precedent.107 The
Upshur Coals Court acknowledged, “The arbitrators’ interpretation

101. Fletcher, 405 F.2d at 1128 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
102. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
103. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
104. Sun Ship, 785 F.2d at 62 (citing Fletcher, 405 F.2d at 1127–28).
105. Id. (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956) (“The
court may not take issue with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract.”)).
106. Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 31, 933 F.2d 225 (4th Cir.
1991).
107. Id. at 226, 230.
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of the contract, and of [legal precedent] may not have been
correct,”108 but “‘[a]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract’ a court may not vacate the
arbitrator’s judgment.”109
In International Association of Machinists, No. 145 v. Modern Air
Transport, Inc., the Fifth Circuit likewise adopted a rationale that
gave super-deference to arbitration awards made under a CBA.110
The court found that since “[i]t is the arbitrator’s construction
which was bargained for,” the proper role of the judiciary was to
evaluate whether or not the arbitrators had exceeded their authority,
not whether they had correctly interpreted the collective bargaining
contract.111 This bifurcation is important: a court may review
whether or not an arbitrator was authorized to arbitrate a certain
issue, but a court may not review (save in very limited instances)
whether the arbitrator gave a proper interpretation of the CBA.112 In
this case, the court found that an arbitrator was still acting in his
authority, even though it would have interpreted the contract
differently.113 The Machinists court’s super-deference exceeded the
standard of review of abuse of discretion in that it deferred to the
arbitrator’s interpretation of both the CBA and legal precedent.
5. Cole v. Burns repackages the reasons for giving extra deference to
CBA-based arbitration awards
Cole v. Burns is noteworthy, because, although its discussion of
the reasons for giving CBA-based arbitration awards a high degree of
deference114 is dicta, it re-establishes the judiciary’s prevailing reasons
for treating CBA-based arbitration decisions differently from (with
more deference than) other arbitration awards. The opinion outlines
three broad arguments: first, arbitration is the alternative to striking
for workers employed under a CBA; second, a CBA is akin to a
micro social contract wherein the arbitrator’s award is an extension
of the agreement itself; third, arbitration within a CBA is more likely
108.
109.
(1987)).
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 231.
Id. at 229 (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38
495 F.2d 1241, 1244–45 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1244 (quoting Steelworkers III, 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)).
Id. at 1244–45.
Id. at 1244.
105 F.3d 1465, 1473–79 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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to result in a just award than arbitration in the case of the nonunionized worker or even in the case of a judge.
a. CBA-based arbitration awards merit extra deference because
labor arbitration is the alternative to mass, industry-wide strikes. First,
Cole asserts that “[i]n the commercial case, arbitration is the
substitute for litigation. Here [under a CBA] arbitration is the
substitute for industrial strife.”115 This resonates with the original
sentiment for passing the LMRA. In the years immediately following
World War II, “more than five million [American] workers
participated in the largest strike wave ever in an advanced capitalist
nation.”116 Congress perceived a need to rein in the power of
organized labor to strike so freely, and so passed the Labor
Management Relations Act,117 which includes a pro-arbitration
provision that applies specifically to labor unions.118 Thus Cole’s
arbitration-or-strike dichotomy has a pedigree that dates back at least
to the passage of the LMRA.
Unfortunately, neither Cole nor Steelworkers III (which originally
stated the arbitrate-or-strike dichotomy) makes explicit the
connection between (1) the proposition that arbitration is needed to
avert industry-stopping strikes, and (2) the idea that CBA-based
arbitration decisions should be awarded a high degree of deference.
Presumably, the connection is that if arbitration decisions are not
given substantial deference, then organized labor will have no
incentive to arbitrate and will strike instead.
b. CBA-based arbitration awards merit extra deference because the
CBA is a mini-social contract. Second, Cole combines rationale from
Steelworkers I and III to show that the authority of a CBA transcends
the mere words of the contract to the point where it is a mini-social
contract, the constitution and government for an entire microsociety. There are two aspects of the CBA, as envisioned in Cole (and
its cited sources), that are more like a mini-social contract than a
mere lengthy contract. First, the CBA is expected to form a new

115. Id. at 1473 (quoting Steelworkers I, 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)).
116. Harris Freeman, Program Notes: In the Shadow of Antilabor Law: Organizing and
Collective Bargaining 60 Years After Taft-Hartley, 11 WORKINGUSA 1, 2 (2008).
117. Id.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006).
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common law that goes beyond interpretation of the agreement.
“The collective bargaining agreement . . . is more than a contract; it
is a generalized code to govern myriad cases which the draftsmen
cannot wholly anticipate. The collective agreement covers the whole
employment relationship. It calls into being a new common law—the
common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant.”119
Second, the CBA-designated arbitration agreement imbues the
arbitrator with authority that is disconnected and independent of her
ability to interpret statutory law or contracts.
[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator’s
construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s
decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract
is different from his.120

The Cole court further found that a bad contract interpretation
by the arbitrator is oxymoronic: “Thus, a ‘misinterpretation’ or
‘gross mistake’ by the arbitrator becomes a contradiction in terms. In
the absence of fraud or an overreaching of authority on the part of
the arbitrator, he is speaking for the parties, and his award is their
contract.”121 Because a union has specifically bargained for the
agreement to arbitrate as part of the CBA, the arbitration award is an
inseparable part of the employment social contract thus brought into
being.
c. CBA-based arbitration awards merit extra deference because
they are more likely to result in a correct decision than a judicial
award. Third, Cole lists various reasons why arbitration within a CBA
is more likely to result in a better or more just award than other
forms of arbitration or even a formal judgment. An arbitrator has
specialized knowledge of the law of the shop that qualifies him
beyond even the “ablest judge” because the arbitrator can take into
account “such factors as the effect upon productivity . . . [and] the

119. Steelworkers I, 363 U.S. 574, 578–79 (1960).
120. Steelworkers III, 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
121. Cole v. Burns, 105 F.3d 1465, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Theodore J. St.
Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and
Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1977)).
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morale of the shop.”122 And with respect to arbitration conducted by
the non-unionized employee, a union is more likely to obtain a fair
award at arbitration because the union is a repeat customer, while
the individual employee generally has only one shot.123 Because the
union is a repeat player, it is better able to pick a non-biased
arbitrator.124 While an individual employee may be presented with an
arbitration clause “on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,” a union not only
bargains for the arbitration agreement, but can return to the
bargaining table after an unfavorable award to restructure the
employment agreement.125
Cole concludes that an arbitration award rendered for an
individual not under a CBA would be subject to a rigorous “manifest
disregard of the law” standard of review that would include actively
asking if the arbitrator had applied the correct law.126 Thus, the Cole
court envisioned a return to the more intuitive definition of
“manifest disregard of the law” (i.e., an actual inquiry into whether
the law has been disregarded), but only for workers not within a
union.
C. In Sum: Divergent Trends in the Enforcement of CBA-based
Arbitration Agreements and CBA-based Arbitration Awards
Thus, the rationales surrounding enforcement of arbitration
agreements and enforcement of arbitration awards have developed
divergently. When the Steelworkers Trilogy was decided in 1960, the
Supreme Court offered similar rationale for all three cases, even
though two dealt with enforcement of an arbitration agreement
(Steelworkers I and II), and one dealt with enforcement of an
arbitration award (Steelworkers III). By the time Wright was decided
thirty-eight years later, an agreement to arbitrate under a CBA had to
be clear and unmistakable—a higher threshold than that imposed for
arbitration of an individual claim. Meanwhile, an arbitration award
made in the context of a CBA fell under a modified “manifest
disregard of the law” standard of review that is less rigorous than the

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
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“manifest disregard of the law”127 test that courts apply to
individuals.
III. AN ENVIRONMENT OF COMPULSORY UNIONIZATION VITIATES
THE REASONS FOR GIVING CBA-BASED ARBITRATION AWARDS A
HIGH DEGREE OF DEFERENCE
A. A Review of Compulsory Unionization Laws
The LMRA is a group of amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act.128 Closed-shop arrangements were legal under the
original NLRA passed in 1935: “[N]othing in this Act . . . or in any
other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a
condition of employment membership therein. . . .”129 Thus the
unamended NLRA left the door open—intentionally or
otherwise130—for state laws providing for compulsory unionization.
When the LMRA was passed twelve years later, § 14(b) was added to
the NLRA, forbidding “agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory
in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or
Territorial law.”131 This did not, however, prove the end of
compulsory unionization. Unions were still able to form “union
shop” agreements in which a non-union employee could be hired on
the condition that he or she join the union within a certain amount
of time. Hence, while “closed shop” may be a misnomer in a
technical sense (the shop is not closed from the outset to prospective
non-union employees), the practical effect of union shop laws is the
same: ultimately the worker must join the union or cease
employment under either arrangement.

127. But “manifest disregard of the law” may no longer be a viable shorthand name for
the judiciary’s approach to overturning arbitration awards since the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). Whether this will
result in a substantive change to that approach remains to be seen. See supra note 87.
128. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text.
129. Nat’l Labor Relations Act 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §
158 (2009)).
130. One commentator has implied that it may have been unintentional. See Raymond L.
Hogler, The Historical Misconception of Right to Work Laws in the United States: Senator Robert
Wagner, Legal Policy, and the Decline of American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101,
104–05 (2005).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2008).
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In 1985, however, the Supreme Court decided Pattern Makers’
v. NLRB, in which it ruled that even where a closed-shop
authorization election has been held, employees could not be fined
for resigning from the union.132 The Court found that fining former
union members effected restraint and coercion on the part of the
union, in violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA.133 For reasons that
will be discussed in Part B below, Pattern Makers’ has not been the
death knell for the closed shop; union and worker behavior have
largely continued unaltered since the Supreme Court’s ruling. By
using the phrases “compulsory unionism” or “closed shop,” this
Comment merely asserts that after a closed-shop authorization
election, at least some workers who otherwise would not have joined
the union do so against their preference. Other legal commentators
likewise continue to use the phrase “closed shop.”134
Currently, twenty-two states have laws that forbid closed-shop
arrangements.135 In the remaining states, workers wishing to
establish a closed-shop workplace must vote.136 Two kinds of
elections must take place. First, a majority of workers must vote to
create a union.137 This is called a certification election. Second, once
a union has been certified, the workers in a workplace may vote to

132. 473 U.S. 95, 115–16 (1985).
133. Id. at 114.
134. For example, the American Law Reports annotation “Closed Shops and Closed
Unions,” though written in 1946, has been revised as recently as 2008 and continues to say:
Whatever may have been the law in earlier times, today it is settled in most
jurisdictions that as a general proposition, a closed-shop agreement, that is, a
collective labor agreement which binds the employer to employ only members of a
single labor union, is a valid contract, and not void as in restraint of trade or against
public policy.
160 A.L.R. 918 (1946) (footnotes omitted). Thus, “[t]he closed shop is a generic term. It
covers a variety of practices which contain a common element. That element is that to obtain
or retain a job an employee must join a trade union, or in other words, union membership is a
condition of employment.” CHARLES HANSON ET AL., THE CLOSED SHOP: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY IN PUBLIC POLICY AND TRADE UNION SECURITY IN BRITAIN, THE USA AND WEST
GERMANY 5 (1982). By using the phrase “closed shop” in the “generic” sense, this Comment
does not focus on the exception created in Pattern Makers’, but rather on the continuing
reality of “join or quit,” demonstrated in Part B of this section.
135. Hogler, supra note 130, at 136.
136. HANSON ET AL., supra note 134, at 175.
137. That a majority of workers would be required to agree for there to be any union
(whether or not the union is to represent them) is a consequence of the exclusivity rule: a
union is the exclusive representative of all employees in a workplace in matters of bargaining
for wages and benefits. See generally J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).

1034

DO NOT DELETE

1011

11/3/2009 10:06 AM

Arbitration Awards

close the shop (requiring union membership (barring proactive
resignation from the employee) and paying union dues as a
condition for continued employment). This is called an
authorization election. Because of this, if more than half of the
workers vote to authorize a closed shop, all other employees must
join the union, cease employment, or proactively resign union
membership.138 The next two parts will demonstrate that because of
this arrangement, in the twenty-eight states that permit closed-shop
arrangements, the Gardner-Denver Court’s observation that there
may exist tension between the union and the employee139 is more
probable.
B. The Effect of Closed-Shop Conditions
The closed-shop work setting leads to a high enough likelihood
of opposition and enmity between employer and union to warrant
greater scrutiny than the current “manifest disregard of law”
standard of review.140 Although some of the analysis supporting this
proposition is supportable (and supported) by empirical evidence,
this premise is axiomatic at its core. The following three lemmas
form a bulwark for this premise: (1) at least some closed-shop
certifying elections are decided by non-unanimous vote, in which
some workers will either be compelled to join the union against their
will or cease employment; (2) conditions before a closed-shop
certifying election have a tendency to produce enmity between
employees because of (a) strikes in which some of the non-union
workers (scabs) continue to work, (b) violence against scabs during
strikes, or (c) campaigning by parties on each side of the issue; and
(3) once the closed shop has become a reality, it is unrealistic to
expect the employee-to-employee opposition to immediately
vaporize.

138. Hanson and his co-authors describe the reality of join-or-quit in great detail.
HANSON ET AL., supra note 134, at 111–42. However, since they wrote before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Pattern Makers’, they fail to include the option of active resignation from
the trade union. See infra notes 145, 148.
139. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 (1974).
140. This Comment does not assert, however, that a higher standard of review is not also
justified under an open shop. As mentioned in note 13, supra, this Comment focuses on closed
shops because they are more demonstrably illustrative of the possibility of a divergence of
interest between worker and employer than open shops.
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1. At least some closed-shop authorizing elections are decided by nonunanimous vote, in which some workers will be compelled to either join
the union against their will or cease employment
The part of this proposition that pertains to non-unanimous
votes is, predictably, much weaker than it could be. One study of
union-certification elections141 voting demographics uncovered a
very mixed field sentiment on the desirability of unions among
voting workers.142 Among thirty-three elections studied, the highest
percentage of workers voting for union-representation was seventysix percent.143 Twenty-two out of the thirty-three elections voted
against union representation, and overall, only forty-five percent of
all workers were in favor of union representation.144 While
dispositions toward unions varied from election to election, the only
constant was that voting among workers was not unanimous.
Though lack of unanimity is easy to demonstrate, as mentioned
above, it is not true, in the technical sense, that workers are forced to
join the union in a closed shop. Despite the Supreme Court’s
sweeping ruling in Pattern Makers’, “join or quit” continues to be
the prevailing mentality in workplaces that have held a successful
closed-shop authorization election.145 The following three factors
may be responsible for this: First, it is not clear to workers that they
have the option of withdrawing from a union because they are still
required to pay union dues under a closed shop.146 Second, union

141. Union certification elections are not the same thing as closed-shop authorization
elections, although they have a similar dynamic. In a union certification election, employees
vote not whether to make their workplace a closed shop, but whether to have a union
representing workers at all. BARBARA KATE REPA, YOUR RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 460
(2007). Even in an open shop, the union is the exclusive representative of the workers to the
employer in terms of wage bargaining.
142. JULIUS G. GETMAN, STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, AND JEANNE B. HERMAN, UNION
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 41 tbl.2-2 (1976).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 40, 41 tbl.2-2.
145. The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. lists “Can I be
required to be a union member or pay dues?” at the top of its FAQ list, http://www.
nrtw.org/. Pundits from the other side also seek to clarify this misconception. See, e.g.,
WrongforMichigan.org,
http://www.wrongformichigan.org/Get_The_Facts.htm
(“The
Right to Work supporters keep talking about ‘compulsory’ unionism. Do all workers have to
be union members when there is a union security clause in a contract?”). Evidently, advocates
on both sides have found that the matter requires clarification.
146. In Communication Workers v. Beck, the Supreme Court ruled that self-removing
employees may still be required to pay agency dues, or the amount of union dues that covers
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members often refuse to work alongside non-union members, thus
forcing employers to choose between hiring all union workers, or no
union workers at all.147 Third, since Pattern Makers’ was handed
down in 1985, the bulk of the historical dialog on the fairness of
closed-shop laws assumes that union membership may be required.
For example, in 1957, the AFL-CIO published the following:
Nobody is deprived of any job because of the union shop, unless
the individual himself decides to make non-membership in a union
a condition for accepting a job.
Joining a union is only one of many qualifications involved in
getting a job. For instance, the worker may be required to have a
certain level of education . . . he may have to be willing to wear
certain types of uniform or work clothes. . . .148

Other factors may also be relevant, such as the fact that
employees must proactively resign from a union after a successful
closed-shop authorization election,149 or that the prevailing terms
“open shop” and “closed shop” have a somewhat non-intuitive
meaning. This Comment merely asserts that, unless an employee
deliberately resigns from the union, the losing party in a successful
closed-shop authorization election joins the union against his will.

collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment with the employer.
487 U.S. 735, 762–63 (1988). An employee who does not want to pay the entire fee is
required to follow a formal objection procedure. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998).
147.
Closed shop bylaws are common in industries such as construction and
entertainment, where jobs are often temporary and the maintenance of closed shop
conditions is important to ensure stability of employment. Members generally
comply with the bylaws by protesting at the presence of non-union employees, by
walking off the job where non-unionists are present or by refusing to work with
employers using non-union labor.
HANSON ET AL, supra note 134, at 172. Of course, this option is available to union members
in both closed- and open-shop settings.
148. WILLIAM TAYLOR HARRISON, THE TRUTH ABOUT RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS 72
(1959) (quoting AFL-CIO, FACTS VS. PROPAGANDA (1957)).
149. See generally Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 133 F.3d at 1012.
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2. Conditions before a closed-shop authorization election may tend to
produce enmity among employees
a. Strikes and hard feelings against scabs. From an axiomatic150
perspective, unions—including those that choose to hold an
authorization election—will resent scabs. Indeed, the unions that
have the greatest reason to show antipathy toward scabs may be
more likely to hold an authorization election, since closing the shop
may be a more desirable goal when an unsuccessful (scab-broken)
strike is in the memorable past.
During a congressional hearing on union policy, one union
worker testified,
The “free rider” is the living example of the bad side of human
nature which takes everything it can get for free . . . I merely say
that as long as a fellow worker of mine, working side by side with
me in a shop . . . as long as he is getting exactly the same benefits
that I am getting from the activities of our organization . . . that is
preposterous, merely because I happened to be a person, an
individual, that has some integrity and is willing to pay my share,
my dues, that some person . . . that has no sense of responsibility to
his fellow man, . . . should actually be allowed just to sit there and
not only let things go by but actually laugh in my face.151

One survey found that seventy percent of union workers found it
ethical to put pressure on non-unionists to join the union by refusing
to work with them.152
b. Strikes and hard feelings felt by scabs. Scabs are treated poorly
by striking workers. A good example of this species of ill treatment is
the factual setting of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, in which union

150. The continued reference to self-evident or axiomatic lemmas may be annoying and
frustrating to academic researchers. The author apologizes and makes three observations. First,
no quantitative research has been performed (that he could find) on the frequency or
prevalence of hard feelings between unionists and non-unionists, residual enmity after a strike,
or (ultimately) overall likelihood of a union to treat its members unfairly; indeed, the author
questions whether one could fairly expect such topics to be researchable. Second, while
anecdotal evidence is plentiful, the plural of anecdote is not data. Therefore, this Comment
purposefully places its axiomatic reasoning before isolated quotations and statistics that
corroborate—but do not directly establish—the assertion of residual hard feelings. Third, by
explicitly stating its underlying assumptions, this Comment invites reasoned academic dialog
and criticism that gets at the foundation of the desirability of union-led grievance procedures.
151. CHAMBERLIN ET AL., LABOR UNIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 72 (1958) (quoting
Testimony of Paul E. Monahan, representing the United Railroad Workers of America, CIO).
152. HANSON ET AL., supra note 134, at 83.
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members physically beat an organizer of a different union for trying
to organize mine work in opposition to a strike.153
c. Campaigning by parties on each side of the issue. Even in the
absence of a strike, a campaign may foment feelings of opposition
between employees. After a close but unsuccessful certification
election in Albion, Indiana, a news report found that although
[t]he matter was settled, . . . the bruising battle in Albion . . .
turned friend against friend. One employee says that the card check
process made her a target and she was threatened by other
employees who wanted the union. “I had my reasons for the way
that I voted. You know that’s nobody else’s business, and had it
not been for the card check, nobody would have known if I was for
or against.”154

Thus, because the procedure for campaigning for unions provides a
forum for employees to demonstrate their attitudes toward
unionization, there may be residual hard feelings, especially in a close
election.155 While the Albion example involved a union certification
election, this Comment argues that the same conditions exist in
amplified form surrounding an authorization election for two
reasons. First, after a successful authorization election, not only will
the union represent all workers in matters of wages, but the union
will also control, in large measure, employee grievance procedures
and employee discipline. Second, a successful authorization election
means that all employees will have to pay dues. Therefore, one might
expect at least as much inter-employee opposition to result from an
authorization election as from a certification election.
3. Once the closed shop has become a reality it is unrealistic that
employee-to-employee opposition will immediately vaporize
After a closed-shop authorization election—and its attendant
campaigning and history—it is self-evidently unrealistic to expect the
residual enmity to dissipate. While unions are required to practice

153. 383 U.S. 715, 718–19 (1966). For more on violence against scabs and union
violence in general, see JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND FEDS (2006).
154. Fox News, (Fox television broadcast Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=LXGRTWnXbK4 (on file with author).
155. Close elections do occur. In one study of thirty-three union certification elections,
six were decided on margins of less than five percent, including one election that was precisely
a 50–50 split. See GETMAN ET AL., supra note 142, at 41 tbl.2-2.
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non-discrimination in the representation of their employees, current
laws make it difficult to prove overt discrimination on the part of the
union:
Closely allied to closed shop bylaws are clauses included in the
collective agreement which permit the union to object to any
employee who adversely affects employer and employee relations.
The union will object to a non-member and the employer in
compliance with the collective agreement will dismiss him. It
would, of course, be extremely difficult to prove that dismissal was
a result of non-membership in the union and, thus,
discriminatory.156

Since union bylaws allow a union to voice objection to the hiring of
anyone “who adversely affects employer and employee relations,”157
it is not necessarily the case that an unpopular employee would be
effectively shielded by statute from retaliatory action.
For the foregoing reasons, there is a higher likelihood of enmity
between employer and union in a closed-shop setting.
C. Why Closed Shops Vitiate the Traditional Reasons for Giving Labor
Arbitration Awards a High Degree of Deference
Part B’s main assertion is that closed shops are more likely to
foment opposition among employee and union; this section places
that assertion in the context of the three main reasons for awarding
CBA-based arbitration decisions the type of extra deference
mentioned in Section I: industrial consequences, furthering a minisocial contract, and achieving increased fairness via arbitration. All
three of these reasons fail in a closed-shop arrangement.
1. Granting arbitration awards a high degree of deference is necessary
to avert large-scale industrial consequences
First, as manifest in Cole’s158 interpretation of Steelworkers I,159
the prevailing judicial attitude toward CBA-based arbitration awards
is that they deserve extra deference in order to prevent industrystopping strikes. This is a poorly supported argument because it

156.
157.
158.
159.
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presumably rests on two implicit, unsupported premises. First,
arbitration (as opposed to litigation in court) prevents labor strikes;
second, arbitration will not be effective in preventing labor strikes
unless arbitration awards are given substantial deference. Cole’s later
invocation of the in-the-trenches labor arbitrator160 may be relevant
to the first premise; one with inside knowledge of the industry and
shop norms may be able to pacify opposing parties better than a
judge, and thereby avert a strike. Aside from the removed reference
to the specialized labor arbitrator, however, Cole leaves as an exercise
to the reader the derivation of the arbitrate-or-strike dichotomy.
a. Best-case scenario: arbitrate-or-strike is less accurate in a closed
shop. This Comment argues that in a best-case scenario, if arbitration
does prevent unions from striking, then it is less true, axiomatically,
in situations where there is tension between the employee and the
union—as is more likely in a closed-shop setting. Assuming that a
strike occurs when employees are unhappy, and that labor arbitration
keeps unions happy (or willing to work—a key idea behind Cole’s
arbitrate-or-strike dichotomy),161 this Comment argues that the
union would probably not choose to strike to protest poor treatment
directed at an unpopular employee. For example, in the event that
such an employee’s grievances were relegated to the judicial system
for ordinary litigation, a union at odds with the employee would
have little incentive to strike upon an unfavorable outcome of the
litigation. Similar factual circumstances surrounded the black
plaintiffs in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.162 In Lukens, the plaintiffs’
union (as well as employer) was found guilty of discriminatory
practices because it both failed to assert the plaintiffs’ original claims
of discrimination and because it tacitly encouraged more
discrimination.163 While Lukens did not involve a reluctantly
unionized employee (there is no statement that the plaintiffs in
Lukens would have chosen not to unionize), it incontrovertibly
demonstrates that unions may prefer (however illegally) not to take a
stand for the employee.
Issues of who has standing to bring an arbitration case may limit
the data available of how many other cases there are like Lukens—in

160. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1480.
161. Id.
162. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); see supra note 5.
163. Id.
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the context of closed shops and open shops. In Humphrey v. Moore,
the Supreme Court ruled that an employee may not challenge a
perceived unfavorable decision of a union unless the employee can
demonstrate that the union acted with fraud or breached its duty of
representation under the CBA.164 The strict hurdles that an employee
must clear in order to attack an arbitration decision may prevent a
judicial record of tension and opposition between the union and the
employee. This Comment makes no statement on the prevalence of
the kind of overt enmity between union and employee that was
present in Lukens. It does argue, however, that the possibility of this
employer-union opposition is exacerbated in a closed-shop
environment, and that procedural standing issues may prevent such
conflicts from coming to light, since union bylaws permit a union to
object to the employment of any worker whose presence “adversely
affects employer and employee relations.”165
If it is not true that a union would strike rather than arbitrate the
claim of an unpopular employee, such an employee might be in
better hands litigating his claim in court.166
b. Worst case scenario: arbitrate-or-strike is right for the wrong
reason. This Comment argues that at worst, the arbitrate-or-strike
dichotomy in Steelworkers I and Cole is right for the wrong reason.
Because tension between employer and union is more likely in a
closed shop, and because labor arbitrators, by Cole’s admission, “can
account for other considerations affecting shop morale and
attitude,”167 a union arbitrator may not represent the best interests of
the individual employee at odds with the union.168 Several cases
demonstrate that unions may pursue a course of legal action (or
inaction) that is contrary to the best interests of the employee,169 and

164. 375 U.S. 335, 349–51 (1964); see also Harvey Bell v. IML Freight, 589 F.2d 502,
506 (10th Cir. 1979); Andrus v. Convoy Co., 480 F.2d 604, 606 (9th Cir. 1973).
165. HANSON ET AL., supra note 134, at 172.
166. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974).
167. Cole v. Burns, 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
168. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19. The Supreme Court has retreated from its
broader anti-arbitration dicta in Gardner-Denver. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct.
1456, 1469 (2009). Because this Comment looks at judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards
from a normative perspective, Gardner-Denver is significant as a historical example of
recognizing tension between the union and the worker that the judiciary ought to apply to the
context of arbitration awards. See supra note 10.
169. E.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335, 342, 348–51 (1964); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Steele v.
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this Comment argues that this is more likely because of the increased
possibility for tension in a closed shop. Moreover, an unpopular
worker is protected only by the very things that arbitrators are not
famous for providing, especially under the current standard of high
deference given labor arbitration awards, namely, strict
implementation of the employment contract and the pertinent legal
statutes.170 Because labor arbitrators may preserve the continuity and
normalcy of the workplace at the expense of unbiased defense of the
individual worker, the arbitrate-or-strike dichotomy may be true in a
closed shop only because arbitrators can practice triage with the
company interests.
c. The second premise. There is another reason why closed-shop
settings blunt the force of Cole’s first reason that giving arbitration
awards deference is necessary to prevent an industry-stopping strike.
Even if arbitration were necessary to stop a strike, it does not follow
that a higher degree of judicial scrutiny would enervate the incentive
to arbitrate. Courts, for example, could still give substantial
deference to labor arbitrators’ findings of fact, while reviewing their
findings for conformity with the law. Thus, in a closed-shop setting,
the assertion that giving arbitration awards a high degree of
deference is necessary to prevent labor strikes is both presumptuous
and harmful to the unpopular employee.
2. Giving arbitration awards a high degree of deference honors the
mini-social contract of labor unions
Second, Cole and Steelworkers III both promulgate the paradigm
that the arbitration agreement is a bargained for part of the collective
bargaining agreement, and therefore the parties have given value to
receive the arbitration award.171 Cole goes so far as to say that a
“gross error” on the part of the arbitrator is an oxymoron, insofar as
the parties have bargained for the arbitrator’s interpretation.172 This
paradigm is simply contradicted in a closed shop with employees
who would rather not be represented by the union. Donald R.

Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen, 323
U.S. 210 (1944).
170. The basic story in the cases in note 169, supra, involve a court stepping in to make
sure that a union plays fair.
171. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1473–79; Steelworkers III, 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
172. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1476.
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Richberg, Chairman of the National Recovery Administration during
the Roosevelt administration, noted:
The entire value of labor organization to the workers lies in this
power of the workers to control their representatives. The basis of
that control and the only assurance that it will continue, is found in
the right and freedom of the individual worker to refuse to support
an organization or a representative whose judgment or good will
he does not trust.173

This Comment submits that failure to represent dissident employees
is a natural outgrowth of the closed-shop system, in which
employees are forced to belong to an organization with which they
would rather not affiliate.
3. Giving arbitration awards a high degree of deference leads to a more
satisfactory outcome
Third, Cole summarized various reasons why CBA arbitration
may lead to a more satisfactory result than either a judicial judgment
or even arbitration of a dispute by the individual worker.174 Foremost
among these was the observation that an arbitrator has specialized
knowledge of the law of the shop that qualifies him beyond even the
“ablest judge,” because she can take into account “such factors as
the effect upon productivity . . . [and] the morale of the shop.”175 It
is precisely these reasons that make arbitration unfit for a closedshop setting: if the arbitrator can indeed take into account factors
such as productivity and morale of the shop, then the unhappy-tojoin-the-union employee is an easy target for letting go. As noted
before, union bylaws under closed-shop CBAs may allow “the union
to object to any employee who adversely affects employer and
employee relations.”176 As demonstrated above, it is likely that in at
least some instances, a former scab or employee who otherwise
opposed union certification and authorization would continue to be
the object of resentment and enmity by fellow employees. This
Comment argues that it is self-evident that finding against such a
person in arbitration may boost the morale of the workplace.
173. EDWARD A. KELLER, THE CASE FOR RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: A DEFENSE OF
VOLUNTARY UNIONISM 32–33 (1956).
174. Cole, 105 F.3d. at 1473–79.
175. Id. at 1474 (quoting Steelworkers I, 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
176. HANSON ET AL., supra note 134, at 172.
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The Cole court also found it noteworthy that CBA arbitration
awards were preferable because a union actually negotiated for the
agreement to arbitrate and could return to the bargaining table later
in a continuing relationship with the employer to iron out any
difficulties.177 An individual employee, the Cole reasoning continued,
is presented with an arbitration clause “on a take-it-or-leave-it basis”
and therefore, in such a contract of adhesion, has no choice but to
accept the obligation to arbitrate or cease working.178 In a closedshop setting, however, those reasons may be reversed: the unpopular
employee may perceive no choice but to accept the union-negotiated
arbitration award or not work at all; he cannot revisit the question
without the union’s sanction.179 If an unpopular and dissatisfied
employee receives an unfavorable arbitration award, then it is
unlikely that she will return or even be represented vicariously at a
future bargaining table with the employer. Therefore, in a closedshop setting it is less safe to assume that the agreement to arbitrate
represents the will of the employee and that the employee will
participate in a positive, ongoing relationship with the employer. For
this reason and the above reasons, closed-shop arrangements vitiate
the reasons for affording arbitral decisions made under a CBA a high
degree of deference.
IV. A MODEST SUGGESTION
Given the foregoing observation that a closed-shop arrangement
nullifies the reasons for awarding super deference to an arbitration
award, this Comment proposes a paradigm that is parallel to the
Supreme Court’s developed view on enforcing arbitration
agreements. As discussed in Section I above, the Supreme Court has
come to hold that in order for an arbitration agreement under a
CBA to be enforceable, it must be “clear and unmistakable.”180 The
Court has voiced concerns—analogous to some of those mentioned
in Section II above—that unless the agreement to arbitrate is clear

177. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1477.
178. Id.
179. “[T]he vast majority (probably 99% or more) of collective bargaining agreements
that contain binding arbitration provisions reserve to the union the right to decide whether to
submit a particular grievance to that forum. Individual employees do not have the right to
arbitrate their grievances absent the union's imprimatur.” Peter Lareau, Peter Lareau on 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 3509, at 14.
180. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78 (1998).
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and unmistakable, the individual employee will not have knowingly
consented to the arbitration.181 As a rough analog of this, closedshop arbitration awards could be subjected to a “manifest disregard
of law” level of scrutiny that includes examining whether the law was
correctly applied. Because there may be tension between the
reluctantly-unionized employee and the union, courts should regard
arbitration decisions made in such a context with a high level of
scrutiny that includes making sure the law was correctly applied.
This need not include forcing judicial-like process and results on
the arbitrator; arbitrators may still render an award that is uniquely
tailored to the workplace. However, since a reluctantly unionized
employee has not bargained for an arbitrator’s interpretation of the
contract or her reading of the statute, federal and state courts should
determine if the law (both statutory and principles of contract
construction) was correctly applied by the arbitrator.
V. CONCLUSION
Holding closed-shop arbitration decisions to a higher level of
scrutiny would ultimately conform with the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Steelworkers III that an arbitration agreement is a
bargained-for element of a CBA.182 If the bargained-for nature of the
arbitration agreement truly does lead to increased enforceability, then
when the employee has not bargained for the arbitration agreement,
the arbitration award should not be treated with such high
deference. Courts’ continued application of the Cole court’s
reasoning to closed-shop settings diminishes the persuasive value and
credibility of those reasons; specifically, it weakens the relationship
between the bargained-for nature of the arbitration agreement and
the level of deference that courts give to the arbitration award.
Therefore, courts should apply a strict “manifest disregard of law”
standard of review to closed-shop arbitration awards.
Currently, the arbitration awards made in a CBA enjoy a high
level of deference from courts,183 while arbitration agreements made
as part of a CBA receive much less deference from the courts.184 The
compulsory unionization that goes hand-in-hand with a closed-shop

181.
182.
183.
184.
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arrangement vitiates and even reverses most of the reasons for
affording CBAs such a high level of deference.185 Parallel to the same
way that the Supreme Court has adopted stricter standards and
greater scrutiny for the enforcement of arbitration agreements under
a CBA, courts should subject arbitration awards to a high level of
scrutiny—strict “manifest disregard of the law”—when there is a
high probability of reluctant unionization. Using such a high level of
scrutiny to review closed-shop arbitration awards would be the most
faithful application of the Supreme Court’s inherent rationale in its
most seminal union decisions.
Nephi Hardman

185. See supra Part III.
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